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I. INTRODUCTION
"Intellectual property" (IP) is a compounding of two things. First, it
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is ideas, inventions and creative expression. They are essentially the re-
sult of private activity. Second, it is public willingness to bestow the sta-
tus of property on those inventions and expressions. The most common
techniques for conferring a protected status are the trade secret, patent,
copyright and the trademark, with one new category for mask works (or
"chips") added in the last decade.'
Though the definition of these terms varies from country to country,
the following is a broad summary definition of terms that is widely ac-
cepted particularly in the U.S., beginning with a basic classification that
differentiates industrial property (patents, trademarks and trade secrets)
from copyright, with mask works as a unique special category.
Patent law confers property rights on new, useful and nonobvious
processes and products. It excludes others from making, using, or selling
the patented invention for seventeen years.2 Patent law provides a more
exclusive monopoly than copyright law. Patent protection extends to
functional features of products and encompasses ideas to the extent that
the ideas are inextricably embodied in the products or process. Unlike a
copyright or trademark, a patent is much more difficult to obtain. To be
patented, an invention must not only be new and original, but it must
also be an improvement over the prior art such that one with ordinary
skill in that art could not consider the invention obvious.3
Trade secrets are industrial or commercial information that enter-
prises wish to keep confidential, but here reliance is placed either on pri-
vate contractual measures with existing employees or on public law or
guarantees where third parties, without contractual relationships, need to
be prevented from engaging in trade secret violations.
Trademarks are marks to distinguish goods or services of an industrial
or commercial enterprise or group of enterprises. They include words,
letters, numbers, drawings, pictures, emblems, monograms, signatures,
colors, and occasionally packaging forms. Most countries require regis-
tration of the mark for protection. Usually there are no time limits on
trademark protection, although many countries require periodic
registration.4
1. R. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 11 (1990). Other
beneficiaries of intellectual property protection include industrial designs, utility models,
marks of origin and plant breeders' rights (PBRs). In the latter case, PBRs are covered
under the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV),
concluded in Paris on December 2, 1961, as amended in 1991. The Convention, which had
21 member states as of January 1, 1992, provides plant protection for between 15 and 18
years though breeders can use an existing protected plant to produce a new variety. As of
1990, UPOV had about 1,000 new plant varieties registered in member states.
2. 17 years is the present period in the U.S. for patent protection from the date of
granting, though for most countries, the period ranges from 15 to 20 years from the date the
patent is filed.
3. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: To-
ward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 279 n.31 (1991).
4. ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS - ISSUES AND CON-
VOL. 21:2
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
Copyright protection covers original expression but not the ideas be-
hind the expression. Copyrightable material includes artistic, literary,
musical, photographic and cinematographic works, etc. Some countries
require registration formalities while for others protection is available au-
tomatically. The international standard for most works usually extends
for fifty years beyond the life of the author.
Finally, the mask work represents the expression of the design ele-
ments of a semiconductor "chip" for which its creator holds exclusive
rights, and thus can be seen as a hybrid between a patent and a
copyright.'
This paper attempts to assess the impact of a variety of multilateral
and bilateral initiatives with respect to IP reform in three Latin Ameri-
can countries (Mexico, Chile and Argentina), all of which are contemplat-
ing or completing legal reforms in this area. The paper begins with an
overview of the multilateral framework for IP protection, an assessment
from an economic perspective of the costs and benefits of increased IP
protection, followed by a detailed country by country evaluation of IP
reforms to date and their origins, and concluding with an assessment of
possible outcomes in future for both multilateral and bilateral IP reform.
II. THE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR IP PROTECTION
Even though IP protection is a function of country specific legislation
and enforcement, a multilateral regime has existed dating back to the
19th century covering at least some elements of IP (trade secrets and
mask works are essentially excluded), but with no real effective dispute
resolution mechanism. Most international agreements that are assigned to
protect IP are administered by the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations (as of December
1974), established by a Convention signed at Stockholm on July 14, 1967,
which came into force in 1970.6 The three most important conventions
under WIPO's responsibility are the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (103 members), established in 1883, and last re-
vised in 1967, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (ninety members), adopted in 1886, and last revised in
1971, and the Madrid Agreement concerning the International Registra-
tion of Marks (twenty nine states) adopted in 1891 and amended as of
1979. In all, WIPO administers nineteen Unions and Conventions.'
TROVERSIES 3 (1987).
5. SHERWOOD, supra note 1, at 12.
6. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), GENERAL INFORMATION
(1992). As of January 1, 1992, there were 128 states that were party to the WIPO
Convention.
7. One of these of special interest is the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) which was
concluded in 1970 and as of January 1, 1992 comprised 49 states. The treaty provides for
the filing of an international application which can then be subject to an "international
search" by one of the major patent offices thereby facilitating the examination of patent
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The Paris Convention covers inventions, trademarks, service marks,
industrial designs, etc. (article 4) and provides for national treatment (ar-
ticle 2) whereby each Contracting State must grant the same protection
to nationals of other Contracting States as it grants to its own nationals.
Furthermore, the Paris Convention (article 4A) provides for a right of
priority of filing (relating back) in a second member country for periods
of one year from filing in the first member country for patent and utility
models, and six months for industrial designs and trademarks (article 4 C
(1)).
Compulsory licenses (article 5) are of great interest to both developed
and developing countries. These licenses are available for lack of working
a patent by the owner within four years from the date of filing or three
years from the date of granting the patent, whichever is later, in the ab-
sence of legitimate reasons. In addition, no proceeding for actual forfei-
ture can be made prior to the completion of two years from the grant of a
compulsory license (article 5(3)), and an assessment that the compulsory
license did not eliminate the cost of not working the patent. Developed
countries have tended to object to compulsory licenses particularly if they
were coupled with mandatory fixed royalty payments while developing
countries have favored compulsory licenses without such a time delay.
Finally, the dispute settlement mechanism (article 29) appears to be
particularly ineffective in that any country at the time of accession can
declare itself not bound by the dispute settlement provision (article
28(i)). But even in the absence of such a declaration, the dispute goes to
the International Court of Justice, after which the losing party could
leave the Paris Convention to avoid the sanction.8
The Berne Convention encompasses literary and artistic works in-
cluding every production in the literary and artistic domain whatever the
mode or form of its expression (article 2 (1)). The Berne Convention re-
quires that protection be given to published or unpublished works of an
author who is a national of a member state. Berne protection also is re-
quired for a work of a non-national of a member state if the work is first
published in a member state or simultaneously published in a non-mem-
ber and a member state. A work is published "simultaneously" if it is
published in a member country within thirty days of its first publication.9
The Berne Convention explicitly rejects the requirement that works
applications in the patent office of another member country. This facility could be of value
in the future to developing countries. Id. at 26-29.
8. The Madrid Agreement, revised seven times since 1891, is open to States party to
the Paris Convention, and provides for the registration of both trademarks and service
marks at the International Bureau of WIPO in Geneva. This can be accomplished once the
owner of the mark has registered it in the national trademark office of the country of origin
(provided it is a Contracting State). By the end of 1991, the number of international regis-
trations affected by the Agreement was 280,000 covering on average 10 countries. See
WIPO, supra note 6 at 32-33.
9. C. JOYCE, W. PATRY, M. LEAFFER, P. JASZI, COPYRIGHT LAW 927 (1991).
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be protected by formalities outside the country of origin (article 5(2)),
and has established a minimum term of protection of life plus fifty years,
or fifty years from publication for anonymous and pseudonymous works
(articles 7(1) and 7(3)). Moreover, a large number of "exclusive" rights
are to be protected including those of translation (article 8), reproduction
(article 9), public performance (article 11) and adaptation (article 12),
though distribution and display rights are not included unlike the U.S.
Copyright Act of 1976 (article 106). Berne provides for a fair use privilege
(article 9(2)) and for moral rights (article 6 his) independently of eco-
nomic rights particularly with respect to the right of attribution and in-
tegrity. In the latter case, the U.S. has long opposed such a provision, and
even when it acceded to the Berne Convention at long last in 1988, the
implementing legislation 0 did not include such a clause on the grounds
that such a provision was already available under the common law, a
questionable argument. Finally, the dispute settlement arrangements (ar-
ticle 33) are similar to those of the Paris Convention, with the same
shortcomings.
Given the perceived weaknesses in the WIPO framework for IP pro-
tection, particularly from the perspective of developed countries, and the
fact that during the 1980s, a number of developed countries, particularly
the U.S., began to run substantial trade deficits, it is not surprising that
more attention from developed country policymakers began to focus on
the need to strengthen the international framework for IP protection."
Thus, at the inauguration of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
under the GATT 2 in Punta del Este in 1986, the Ministerial Declaration
included for the first time, largely at the insistence of the U.S.,"3 a man-
date to address Trade-related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs), including Trade in Counterfeit Goods:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and ade-
quate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall
aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate on appropriate new
rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of princi-
10. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853.
11. However, it should be pointed out that WIPO has taken the initiative to attempt to
harmonize patent and trademark law through the preparation of a draft Patent Law Treaty
and a Draft Treaty on the simplification of administrative procedures concerning marks. In
addition, WIPO is also considering a multilateral treaty on the settlement of IP disputes
between states.
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 43, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
13. For a detailed background to the talks that led up to the Uruguay Round, see A.
Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uru-
guay Round: Laying the Foundation, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
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pies, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counter-
feit goods, taking into account work already undertaken in the
GATT.1
4
Over the next five years, negotiations continued on this and many
other issues with no immediate resolution in sight given the obvious link-
ages of most issues since concessions would be expected in one area by
developing countries (e.g., TRIPs) in exchange for concessions in another
by developed countries (e.g., agriculture, textiles). A complicating factor
was that many developing countries saw no need to include TRIPs as
part of the GATT Round, even though article XX(d) of the GATT makes
a brief reference to IP, when an existing UN agency (WIPO) that had
been clearly established for that purpose was already available. Devel-
oped countries, particularly the US, were unwilling to support further ne-
gotiations under the auspices of WIPO given the lack of results in the
past, and the alleged bias of WIPO against the enforcement of IP rights,
particularly against a backdrop where developed countries had considera-
bly more voting strength in the GATT than in WIPO.
As a result of the impasse, the GATT Secretariat itself drafted a
compromise document" based on earlier competing texts covering all as-
pects of the Uruguay Round with the hope that all parties would agree,
though this to date has proven to be premature given the subsequent lack
of progress in negotiations, particularly initially in the agricultural area
between the European Community and the U.S. Given the recent change
in the U.S. administration, it is unclear if and when a successful Uruguay
Round will be achieved.
Even before the inauguration of the Uruguay Round, however, the
U.S. moved to proceed unilaterally to increase pressure on its trading
partners, primarily developing countries (eg. Korea), to improve their IP
protection legislative and enforcement frameworks, in the light of the
mounting U.S. trade deficit. In March 1987, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) at the request of President Reagan asked the
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to prepare quantitative esti-
mates of the distortions in U.S. trade caused by inadequate IP protection,
and to identify the products and countries that were the major culprits.
The results, 6 qualified by limitations due to lack of statistical validity,
estimated worldwide losses to U.S. industry from inadequate foreign IP
protection ranging from US$43 to US$61 billion per annum. Whatever
14. Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este of September 20, 1986, reprinted in LAW
AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT 31 (Kenneth R. Simmonds & Brian H.W. Hill eds. 1988).
15. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/FA, December 20, 1991 (Dunkel Draft) reprinted in THE
DUNKEL DRAFT, FROM THE GATT SECRETARIAT (The Institute for International Legal Infor-
mation ed., 1992).
16. USITC, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT
ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, INVES-
TIGATION No. 332-245, at H-3 (1988).
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the accuracy of the numbers, they were sufficient to persuade the U.S.
Congress to include "tougher" provisions in its 1988 Trade Act" which
requires the USTR to identify, within thirty days after submission of
the annual National Trade Estimates (foreign trade barrier) report to
the Congress, those foreign countries that (1) deny adequate and ef-
fective protection of intellectual property rights or fair and equitable
market access to U.S. persons that rely upon intellectual property
protection, and (2) those countries under (1) determined by the
USTR to be priority foreign countries. The USTR identifies as priori-
ties only those countries that have the most onerous or egregious acts,
policies or practices that have the greatest adverse impact on the rele-
vant U.S. products and that are not entering into good faith negotia-
tions or making significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negoti-
ations to provide adequate and effective intellectual property right
protection.18
In May of 1989, the USTR announced no "Priority Foreign Coun-
tries" but instead developed a "Priority Watch List" of eight countries
(including Mexico) and a "Watch List" of seventeen countries. The "Pri-
ority Watch List" was reduced to five when the USTR reported to Con-
gress on November 1, 1989 (Korea, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia had been
removed based on substantial progress). "In January 1990, Mexico was
removed from all "Special 301" lists after outlining a program for im-
proved protection for patents, trademarks, and trade secrets as well as
improved enforcement of the laws in these areas."' "
In addition, the U.S. government had begun negotiations initially
with Mexico on the possibility of joining the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), a step that would require an improved Mexican IP
environment which in fact occurred even prior to the NAFTA agreement.
In August 1992, provisional agreement was reached amongst the U.S., Ca-
nada and Mexico 0 on NAFTA. Similarly, other Latin American coun-
17. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (amend-
ing Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to include a "special 301" to deal with priority IP
protection).
18. Committee on Ways and Means, Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statis-
tics, H.R. Doc. No. 102-5, 102nd Congress, 1st Session. 76 (1991).
19. Id. at 77.
20. The broad outlines of the agreement are contained in a "Description of the Pro-
posed" prepared by the three governments dated August 12, 1992 and which contains at 26-
27 the following provisions on IP protection:
Building on the work done in the GATT and various international intellectual
property treaties, NAFTA establishes a high level of obligations respecting in-
tellectual property. Each country will provide adequate and effective protec-
tion of intellectual property rights on the basis of national treatment and will
provide effective enforcement of these rights against infringement, both inter-
nally and at the border.
The Agreement sets out specific commitments regarding the protection of:
copyrights, including sound recordings; patents; trademarks; plant breeders'
rights; industrial designs; trade secrets; integrated circuits (semiconductor
1993
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tries, as part of the Enterprise for Americas Initiative (EAI), anticipated
similar possibilities, particularly Chile. Thus, the U.S. took the lead in
attempting to reform IP protection at the multilateral level through the
TRIPs negotiation, while at the same time, moving aggressively to negoti-
ate bilateral concessions from developing countries particularly when
trade benefits (or denial of existing benefits) were at stake.
III. ECONOMICS OF IP PROTECTION
Until recently, most of the literature on the economics of IP protec-
tion concentrated on developed countries and in a "closed" economy, ig-
noring the international trade and investment dimension. Under a domes-
tic analysis, IP would be viewed as an
asset generated by creative action, such as invention or authorship. As
with more tangible forms of private property, the owners of intellec-
tual property are, in most countries, allowed to garner its returns
through commercial exploitation. It is the ability to appropriate these
returns that provides the necessary incentive for further creative ac-
tivity, a big factor in an economy's commercial and cultural growth.
Unlike tangible property, however, intellectual property derives from
the creation of new information, which is essentially a public good.
Among the characteristics of public goods that would influence eco-
chips); and geographical indications.
Copyright. The Agreement's obligations include requirements to: protect com-
puter programs as literary works and databases as compilations; provide rental
rights for computer programs and sound recordings; and provide a term of pro-
tection of at least 50 years for sound recordings.
Patents. The NAFTA provides protection for inventions by requiring each
country to: provide product and process patents for virtually all types of inven-
tions, including pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals; eliminate any spe-
cial regimes for particular product categories, any special provisions for acqui-
sition of patent rights and any discrimination in the availability and enjoyment
of patent rights made available locally and abroad; and provide patent owners
the opportunity to obtain product patent protection for pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical inventions for which product patents were previously
unavailable.
Other Intellectual Property Rights. This section also provides rules for protect-
ing: service marks to the same extent as trademarks; encrypted satellite signals
against illegal use; trade secrets generally, as well as for protecting from dis-
closure by the government test data submitted by firms regarding the safety
and efficacy of pharmaceutical and agri-chemical products; integrated circuits,
both directly and in goods that incorporate them; and geographical indications
so as to avoid misleading the public, while protecting trademark owners.
Enforcement Procedures. The NAFTA also includes detailed obligations re-
garding: procedures for the enforcement of intellectual property rights, includ-
ing provisions on damages, injunctive relief and general due process issues; and
enforcement of intellectual property rights at the border, including safeguards
to prevent abuse.
A more detailed statement of agreement of the parties with respect to intellectual property




nomic behavior is the problem that market participants have little in-
centive to compensate the inventor once the information underlying
the invention becomes known. . . .This problem necessitates the es-
tablishment of a set of protective devices that go beyond forms of pro-
tection for ordinary property. These devices assign and preserve the
rights to exploit intellectual property. In general, intellectual property
rights (IPRs) refer to the legal authority of a creator to control the
means by which the new information or idea is disseminated and com-
mercialized and to the enforcement mechanisms to which the creator
may appeal to prevent unauthorized use.2
1
Before examining the special economic dimension of IP protection in
developing countries, the following is a brief summation of the economic
arguments underlying each of the major forms of IP protection. In the
case of patents, governments have traditionally emphasized two primary
objectives in adopting a system of patents for inventions, namely to pro-
vide economic incentives to encourage investment activity and to have
inventors disclose their "secrets" to society thereby encouraging the
speed in the use of technology. The dilemma facing policy-makers is that
inventions are "public goods", and in the absence of any form of protec-
tion, it is problematic whether "consumers" can be prevented from using
such goods without appropriate remuneration, thereby creating a free-
rider problem. This is compounded by the fact that the costs of invention
can be substantial while the cost of disseminating that knowledge is close
to zero. Thus,
the distribution of an additional unit of knowledge goods does not di-
minish the stock of those goods. The marginal cost of an additional
unit will therefore be influenced not by production cost but only by
distribution cost, which are insignificant. According to static economic
criteria, the optimum market price for the knowledge or invention,
once produced, should be roughly zero. The normal function of the
market thus poses a problem of appropriatability for the inventor. At




In order to avoid the appropriatability problem, the patent provides for a
temporary monopoly (but only with respect to the specific invention but
not to the market it serves since there is often competition from similar
competing substitutes) leading to quasi-rents that provide sufficient in-
centives to investors faced with market failures to continue both to invent
and disseminate their inventions to the public. The optimal policy pack-
age may be to strengthen IP protection, but lower tariffs and other barri-
ers to competition that naturally work on the non-technology barriers in
the competitive advantage package.
There is little empirical evidence available that could categorically
21. Keith Maskus, The Economics of International Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights: Background and Analysis 5-6 (June 1989) (unpublished).
22. BENKO, supra note 4, at 17.
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document the impact of the availability of patent protection on levels of
investment in technological innovation though this would certainly vary
with the type of industry involved (pharmaceuticals and chemicals having
among the highest correlation)." This raises the question as to whether
normal competition provides, in many industries, a sufficient basis for in-
novation or where market imperfection in terms of the rapidity with
which competing firms could imitate the technology in the absence of
patent protection negates the need for such a device. In any event, firms
must constantly make the trade-off between filing for patent protection
to gain a "monopoly" advantage for seventeen years but with ultimate
disclosure of its invention, versus the option of using trade secret protec-
tion which can be infinite unless violated where either breach of contract
or tort remedies are available (though in the case of pharmaceuticals,
trade secret protection is not an option given the ease with which such
products can be copied). However, trade secrets also run the risk of being
lost either through reverse engineering or through normal independent
commercial developments. 24 A related issue for which there is again no
conclusive evidence available is whether seventeen years constitutes an
appropriate length of time for protection, with the expectation that the
longer the period, the more likely that "monopoly" profits or quasi-rents
more than offset the development costs of the invention.
In the case of copyrights, the economic justification for providing
protection is similar to that of patents with respect to industrial property.
Creative literacy and artistic works require an investment of time, the
application of originality, and the benefits of training which, without pro-
tection, would permit others to "free ride" particularly in an environment
where advances in copying technology worldwide has made the mecha-
nism of copying relatively simple and cheap.
The traditional economic and welfare implications of this trend are
well-known. Clearly, the greater use of copying technologies delivers
creative goods to consumers at lower costs. The reduction in demand
for originals lowers the gap between price and marginal production
and distribution costs, raising social welfare. Stronger laws against
copying would increase this distortion, reducing welfare. However,
copying also diminishes incentives for creative activity and the legiti-
mate dissemination of new creations, resulting in a welfare decline
that would be offset by greater performance of property rights. Copy-
right policy should presumably be designed to effect an optimal trade-
off between these impacts.2
In addition, the evolving nature of technology with the growth in the
23. E. MANSFIELD, PATENTS AND INNOVATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, MANAGEMENT SCI-
ENCE, 1986.
24. For a more detailed treatment of the economic justification for trade secret laws at
the State level in the U.S. see D. Friedman, William Landes & Richard Posner, Some Eco-
nomics of Trade Secret Law 5 J. EcON. PERSP., No. 1, 61-72 (1991).
25. Maskus, supra note 21, at 26-27.
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use of software, semiconductors and satellite transmissions has raised ad-
ditional questions as to whether patents or copyright is the more appro-
priate form of protection. In a few countries (U.S. and Japan), this has
led to the creation of new categories of protection such as for computer
chips (mask works2 6) or special measures such as compulsory licenses for
broadcasters (U.S.) who transmit satellite signals to cable operators at
rates set by a government regulatory agency (Copyright Royalty
Tribunal) .27
Trademarks are one of a variety of means (including brand names
and marks of origin) that are used to identify and provide protection for
goods or products from firms, and at the same time, protect consumers
from false advertising and fraud.
Like patents and copyright, trademarks carry legal authority to en-
force the exclusive use of an asset created by human thought. In this
case, the asset is a symbol or other identifier that conveys information
to the customer about the product being purchased. If consumers view
the mark as an indicator of some desirable product characteristic,
such as high quality, they will be willing to pay a premium price for
the good. This premium price compensates the firm for the cost of
developing and advertising the trademark. If competitors were al-
lowed to duplicate the mark or use a confusingly similar mark these
costs could not be recovered. Unlike patents and copyrights, however,
trademarks do not protect the creation of additional human knowl-
edge, but rather the identification of a product. Such identification is
not a public good. Thus, trademarks serve in part to augment the
ability to differentiate products and to sustain, associated monopoly
profits.2"
However, consumer preferences in the light of disappointments in
quality choice can offset such monopoly profits as can legal remedies in-
volving false advertising as well as the availability of other trademarks to
reduce market power.
IV. THE PROTECTION OF IP FROM A DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
With the recent prominence of TRIPs negotiations as part of the
Uruguay Round, increasing attention has been paid by economists to the
tradeoffs at the international level of increased IP protection particularly
including the perspective of developing countries.
.Given the paucity of data on such matters in developing countries
and the fact that in most developing countries, recent legislative reforms
involving increased domestic IP protection provide insufficient time in
which to make a "with" and "without" assessment, nevertheless, a num-
26. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1984).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1); 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A).
28. Maskus, supra note 21, at 32-33.
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ber of recent efforts have been made to develop models to analyze29 the
problem or to itemize the various pros and cons that developing countries
should consider in general in deciding on an appropriate level of
protection. 0
In the latter case, Primo-Braga has assembled a reasonably compre-
hensive list of factors that developing countries should consider in their
IP policy.
On the cost side, any acceleration of IP protection may involve in-
creased royalty payments based on licensing agreements which would be
particularly important for countries at the earlier stages of development
that are largely dependent upon imported technology,8 1 while many of
those at a more advanced stage are already facing substantial outflows
due to large debt service. However, without protection, those who are
willing to license will tend to charge higher royalties because of the higher
risk of loss. This is an area on which further empirical research would be
helpful.
Secondly, tighter enactment and enforcement of IP laws could dis-
place to a variable extent, depending upon local circumstances, local "pi-
rates" for on-patent products on the assumption that most excess de-
mand would be obtained by foreign IP holders. An attempt to quantify
the impact of this across seven countries (Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, In-
dia, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) was made in 1985 for a variety of
industries using somewhat questionable assumptions of price elasticities
of demand, market size and the fact that private domestic firms would
not survive a tightened level of IP protection.12 This resulted in revenues
foregone to IP holders in 1985 for all seven countries of $1.7 billion for
the pharmaceutical industry and $0.5 billion for the software industry,
with lesser amounts for a range of other industries (e.g., agrochemicals,
book publishing, audio, video, etc.). Nevertheless, these numbers should
be looked at with some caution given the questionable methodology
employed.
A third perceived cost of strengthened IP protection would be the
risk of fostering anti-competitive effects through the exercise of market
power to reduce output, raise prices, and repatriate the producer surplus
29. ISHAC DIVAN AND DANi RODRIK, PATENTS, APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY, AND NORTH-
SOUTH TRADE, (PRE WORKING PAPER SERIES, No. 251 The World Bank 1989); R.M. Fein-
berg et al., The Economic Effects of Intellectual Property Rights Infringement, JOURNAL OF
BUSINESS, Jan. 1990, at 79-80.
30. C. Primo Braga, The Developing Country Case for or Against Intellectual Property
Protection in STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 69-87 (World Bank 1990).
31. Less than one percent of existing patents are held by nationals of developing coun-
tries in OECD, Economic Arguments for Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, TC/WP
(88)70 (1989).
32. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 378-407,




beyond consumer price increases that might be expected as part of ad-
ding IP costs to products which, for an industry like pharmaceuticals,
could have a substantial impact on the poorer segments of the society.
However, in practice this effect could be mitigated in many cases by the
availability of a competing substitute that may already be off-patent, par-
ticularly with respect to pharmaceuticals.
An additional consideration would concern the non-use of patents,
for example, in a particular country which could lead to the use of com-
pulsory licensing under certain circumstances (e.g., reasonable time pe-
riod for non-use without adequate explanation) though these devices in
turn are subject to abuse by developing countries particularly with the
setting of-artificially low royalty payments. Moreover, where a patentee
satisfies the working requirement through importation, there should be
little justification for a compulsory license.
Finally, arguments have been made to the effect that IP reform could
result in the bidding up of the price of domestic R&D capacity as a result
of greater protection thereby having a counterproductive impact on in-
come distribution, though hard evidence is not available to support such
a theory.
On the benefit side, the most common argument given for increasing
IP protection has been its expected impact on technology transfer on the
assumption that multinationals would be more likely to license technol-
ogy and/or engage in joint ventures where their technology is adequately
protected.3  A more recent survey undertaken by E. Mansfield 4 shows
similar results for multinationals though with a clear distinction between
industries such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals where R&D costs are
high but subsequent entry costs lower causing high reluctance to invest
vs. other industries with opposite characteristics.
A second reason given for strengthened IP protection involves its al-
leged impact on domestic R&D in developing countries. However, strong
empirical evidence to support this proposition is not yet available partly
because it is too early to measure the impact of IP reform on domestic
R&D in countries such as Mexico and Brazil.35 Nevertheless, some anec-
dotal evidence suggests that many domestic firms welcome strengthened
IP protection as a result of greater confidence in greater investment in
R&D and affiliations with research parks and universities in addition to
less concern that domestic employees will be hired away in the absence of
33. 75 percent of respondents of multinational manufacturing enterprises cited inade-
quate IP protection as a significant problem for licensing to developing countries; see
OECD, International Technology Licensing: Survey Results, mimeo, table 40, (August
1987).
34. E. Mansfield, research project funded by the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) to be completed in May, 1993.
35. However, the case of Italy is instructive in that prior to 1979 it provided no patent
for pharmaceuticals, but since that time, Italy has become one of the leading producers of
new pharmaceutical products in the world.
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trade secret legislation, for purposes of a competitor obtaining secret for-
mulas, customer lists, etc.36
A third rationale for IP protection has been the greater likelihood
that more information would be diffused in the domestic economy con-
cerning technology developments though it is not clear that a developing
country could not avail itself of good library facilities overseas dealing
with patents to achieve the same objectives as in the case of Brazil.
3 7
While a number of less important benefits are sometimes cited,38 the
most important remaining factor concerns the trade impact of IP protec-
tion (the so-called "marriage of convenience") which arises as a result of
the threats and/or actual actions that developed countries have taken
(e.g., the U.S. and the EC) on a bilateral basis in the face of inadequate
IP protection. While this element goes beyond purely economic argu-
ments, the practice of imposing tariff penalties on even unrelated export
goods from developing countries is -of sufficient importance to warrant
considerable weight in the policy debate of developing countries and
which has already resulted in substantial IP reforms particularly in the
Far East.
V. MEXICO
Over the past fifteen years, the legal regime providing for IP protec-
tion in Mexico has undergone radical changes in the direction of enhanc-
ing such protection to the point where it substantially exceeds the level of
protection provided by most other developing countries, and indeed, be-
gins to match, at least in some initial areas, the kind of protection pro-
vided in the U.S. The evolution of such reforms 9 can be traced to a num-
ber of factors including: (a) the aftermath of the debt crisis that Mexico
experienced in the early 1980s when it became clear that a substantial
opening up of its economy both with respect to trade and foreign invest-
ment, including technology transfer, was required to improve interna-
tional competitiveness of its domestic industry, and in the late 1980s to
reduce levels of inflation; (b) as part of that process, Mexico's accession to
the GATT in August 1986 as a developing country and its consequent
effect on overall trade reform and in Mexico's participation in the Uru-
guay Round begun in 1986 in Punta del Este including TRIPs negotia-
tions; (c) Mexico's receipt of technical assistance from WIPO to reform
its IP regime, which oversees the Paris and Berne Conventions to which
36. SHERWOOD, supra note 1, at 132-149.
37. Id. at 56.
38. See Braga, supra note 30, at 83.
39. See Gretchen A. Pemberton and Mariano Soni, Jr., Mexico's 1991 Industrial Prop-
erty Law, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 103, 104 (1992); John McKnight and Carlos Moiggenburg,
RN., Mexico's New Intellectual Property Regime: Improvements in the Protection of In-
dustrial Property, Copyright, License and Franchise Rights in Mexico, 27 INT'L LAW. 27




Mexico is a signatory; and finally (d) bilateral negotiations with the U.S.
on trade and investment culminating in Mexico's inclusion in USTR's
"priority watch" list under Section 182 of the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988 (Special 301), all of which subsequently led to
the major legislative reforms in all areas of IP protection in Mexico in
1991. Thus, it was a combination of both external and internal pressures
(including domestic industries who saw advantages from their own per-
spective in increased IP protection)' 0 that led to the IP reforms in Mexico
in the past year.
A. Patents, Trademarks and Trade Secrets
Until July of 1991, Mexico's overall IP regime was governed by the
Law on Inventions and Trademarks' which was subsequently amended
in 1987,42 and clarified as part of regulations issued to implement the
1987 amendments. Overall, this law and its amendments were considered
to be deficient in a number of respects.4
3
Mexico provided protection for inventions through patents (both
process and product) and through what were called certificates of inven-
tion which provided royalties to the holders of the certificate from anyone
using the invention under a non-exclusive license. Up until July 1987, no
certificate of invention had ever been granted in Mexico.4 4 With respect
to product and process patents, the 1987 amendment provided for inclu-
sion of the following but only after 1997:
1. Biotechnological processes to obtain the following products: phar-
maceutical and chemical products, medicines in general, beverages
and food for animal consumption, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides,
fungicides or biological-activity products;
2. Genetic processes to obtain vegetables and animal species or vari-
eties thereof;
3. Chemical products;
4. Chemical and pharmaceutical products, medicines in general, bev-
erages and food for animal consumption, fertilizers, pesticides, herbi-
cides, fungicides, and biological-activity products.'
3
The 1991 law46 both did away with the 1997 target date and ex-
40. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 238-244.
41. Ley de Invenciones y Marcas, D.O. [Official Federal Diary of Mexico] (10 February
1976) [hereinafter 1976 LAW].
42. SECRETARIA DE COMERCIO Y FOMENTO INDUSTRIAL, Decreto por el que se Reforma y
Adiciqna la Ley de Invenciones y Marcas, D.O. (16 January 1987) [Directive to Reform and
Amend the Law on Inventions and Trademarks].
43. For an assessment of the IP laws prior to 1991, see USITC, RzvIEw OF TRADE AND
INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES BY MEXICO AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE UNITED
STATES-MEXIcO RELATIONS, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-282, 6-3 - 6-5, (1990) [hereinafter USITC,
U.S.-MExico REVIEW].
44. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 253.
45. USITC, U.S.-MExico REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-2.
46. Ley de Fomento y Proteccion de la Propriedad Industrial, D.O. (June 27, 1991)
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panded coverage to include:
alloys; chemicals in general; pharmaceuticals, drugs, agriculture chem-
icals and products with a biological activity; foods and beverages in
general, including those for human consumption, biotechnological
processes to obtain pharmaceuticals, drugs, food and beverages, agri-
culture chemicals, and products with a biological activity (these were
previously protectable under a certificate of invention, but these cer-
tificates have disappeared from the Mexican law); peanut varieties;
microorganism-related inventions; genetic methods to obtain plant va-
rieties; and compositions of matter in general .... The new law pro-
vides for restrictions to patentability in the case of the following types
of inventions, all relating to living matter: essentially biological
processes involving plants, animals and their varieties; genetic meth-
ods regarding biological material capable of self-replication; plant spe-
cies and animal brands and species; biological material, as found in
nature; genetic material; and inventions regarding the living matter of
the human body.' 7
Complementing this broadened scope of coverage of the new law is
the inclusion, for the first time of a definition of invention namely "every
human creation that allows matter or energy existing in nature to be
transformed, for exploitation by man, through the immediate satisfaction
of a specific need. Included among inventions are processes or products
for industrial application.' 8 Inventions must also meet a test of novelty
and be the result of inventive activity. Novelty is preserved for up to
twelve months, provided that within twelve months prior to the filing
date of the patent application, or in such case, of the recognized priority
date, the inventor or his assignee had disclosed the invention by any com-
munication medium or had exhibited it at a domestic or international
exhibition.49 Specifically excluded from inventions are theoretical or sci-
entific principles, discoveries consisting of making known or disclosing
something that already existed in nature; schemes, plans, rules and meth-
ods to perform mental feats, games or businesses; computer software,
forms of presentation of information; aesthetic creations and artistic or
literary works; the methods of surgical or therapeutic treatment or diag-
nosis applicable to the human body . . . ; the juxtaposition of known in-
ventions or mixtures of known products.5" The duration of the patent has
been increased to twenty years from the date of filing though given the
long time to process an application (three to five years under the old sys-
tem), the net effective life of the patent may be substantially less. The
term of the patent for pharmochemical or pharmaceutical products may
be extended by three years if the patent owner grants a license to a cor-
poration with majority Mexican capital subject to other procedural re-
[hereinafter 1991 LAW].
47. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT (BNA), 236 (Sept. 1991).
48. 1991 Law, supra note 46, Art. 16 (translation).
49. Id. arts. 15 & 18.
50. Id. art. 19.
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strictions.51 The new law also provides, for the first time, for the protec-
tion of utility models with ten year protection and industrial designs and
models with fifteen year protection but only covering domestic novelty, a
distinction not explained or justified. 5
Another major area of reform has been in the area of compulsory
licenses, which are permitted under the Paris Convention under certain
circumstances but can be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction for
legitimate reasons.5" Under the 1976 law, as amended, the Mexican Pat-
ent and Trademark Office (MPTO) could issue a compulsory license to a
third party:
(1)where a patent holder has not satisfied the working requirements
(2)exploitation of the patent has been suspended for six months
(3)exploitation of the patent does not satisfy the national market, and
(4)the patent is not being used in the export market and someone has
expressed an interest in using the patent for exports.
4
The provisions for compulsory license now come closer to the provi-
sions of the Paris Convention (though there is still a public interest basis
for a compulsory decision) in that there is no obligation to work a patent
but compulsory licenses are available to third parties under the same
Paris Convention conditions with the addition that the patentee would
have an additional one year following notice of the request for a compul-
sory license to begin working the patent.55 However, of considerable sig-
nificance is the provision in Article 70 of the amended 1976 law which
recognizes the act of importation as precluding the use of compulsory
licenses.
With respect to trademarks, most of the objectionable features in the
1976 IP law were removed by the 1987 amendment including the compul-
sory linkage of foreign marks to Mexican marks.56 Under the new law, the
term of registration is increased from five to ten years, the registration
will lapse if the mark is not used for three consecutive years at any time
during the ten year period, without adequate justification, and marks
would be non-registrable that are confusingly similar to well-known
marks in Mexico. Further, under the new law, nullity actions have been
foreclosed based on the fact that the registration was granted in violation
of any provision of the law at the time the registration was granted,
thereby removing great uncertainty amongst mark owners.
5 7
With respect to trade secrets, prior to the 1991 law, protection was
very limited as a result of a vague definition of what constituted a trade
51. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORt, supra note 47, at 236.
52. Id. at 238.
53. Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 4.
54. USITC, U.S.-MExlco REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-2.
55. 1976 Law, supra note 41, art. 71.
56. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 263.
57. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 47, at 239.
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secret and by deduction a violation of such, a threshold of burden of
proof on the plaintiff to demonstrate a violation against third parties,
cumbersome procedures through the MPTO to investigate violations, and
finally the absence of preliminary remedies such as injunctions to prevent
injury while a trade secret investigation is underway.5 8
The 1991 law includes significant changes in the trade secret protec-
tion regime. To begin with, trade secrets are now more clearly defined to
include any information having industrial utility that is kept in confiden-
tial fashion, regarding which sufficient means or systems have been un-
dertaken to preserve its confidential nature and limit access thereto. The
trade secret must necessarily relate to the nature, characteristics or pur-
poses of products, production methods or processes, the means and forms
of distribution or trade or the rendering of services.
5 9
Secondly, both the firm hiring an employee that is allegedly "bring-
ing" the trade secret to this new position as well as the employee would
be liable for trade secret violation. Furthermore, technology transfer
agreements would be permitted to include confidentiality clauses6" which
in the past required special government approval if the agreement ex-
ceeded ten years. 1 On the other hand, protection is only provided for
trade secrets that are reduced to documentary form (i.e., no intangible
protection). Moreover, no specific provision was made for preliminary in-
junctions to reduce the impact of the violation.
While the above measures have certainly strengthened the legal
framework for IP protection, unless this is accompanied by improvements
in enforcement effectiveness, the impact of such changes will be seriously
undermined.
Under the previous law, which provided for both civil and criminal
penalties for patent and trademark violations, the time required to pur-
sue civil or criminal actions was so lengthy that the vast majority of suits
were settled to avoid years of delay involving administrative review
within the MPTO followed by a layer of appeals through the court system
(including a substantial number of recourses necessitating a restarting of
proceedings). Moreover, even though criminal prosecutions could be com-
menced simultaneously with civil action, the prosecution could only pro-
ceed once the civil actions were completed.2 On the other hand, the law
did provide for temporary relief in the form of the prohibition of sale of
infringing products by the MPTO and/or the seizure of the infringing
products and closure of stores selling such items under certain circum-
58. USITC, U.S.-MExico REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-16.
59. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 47, at 238 (reflecting a transla-
tion of art. 82 of the 1991 law).
60. Id. art. 84.
61. USITC, U.S.-MExIco REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-16. The Law on the Control and
Registration of the Technology Transfer (D.O., January 11, 1982) has been repealed.
62. For a more detailed treatment of the enforcement problems under the old 1991 law,
see USITC, U.S.-MExico REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-8 to 6-9.
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stances." Nevertheless, the inadequate staffing, both legal and technical,
of the MPTO contributed substantially to the general delay in enforce-
ment. As of 1988, MPTO had 330 employees in its patent examination
division to handle roughly 500 applications, of which ninety percent were
foreign.
64
Under the new law, enforcement measures have been strengthened
through stronger procedures for inspection authorized by the MPTO to
seize infringing goods, a simplified system of launching criminal prosecu-
tion whereby only an opinion from the MPTO rather than a time-con-
suming administrative declaration is required, and the inclusion of trade
secrets violation as a criminal offense. 65 Specific fines, shutdowns and ad-
ministrative imprisonment for infringement have been included.6 Finally,
the new law proposes the creation of a new Industrial Property Institute
which would provide support for the promotion of technology develop-
ment and research and development as well as begin to take on some of
the functions of the understaffed and underresourced MPTO. A special
study financed by the World Bank is underway by WIPO to ascertain the
appropriate role for the new Institute in addition to examining the need
for judicial reform in this area.
While all these measures are welcome, it is still too early to judge
their efficacy, particularly since accompanying regulations are still tobe
issued, though they represent a significant step in the right direction.
B. Copyright
Copyright protection is provided by Article 28 of the Mexican Con-
stitution and the Law Amending the Federal Law of Copyright of Decem-
ber 23, 1956 (as amended up to December 30, 1981).67 On July 3, 1991 the
law was again amended to deal with some of the weaknesses of the earlier
law. Mexico is already a member of the Rome, Berne, Universal Copy-
right and Geneva Phonogram Conventions. Overall, Mexico's Copyright
Law, even prior to the latest amendments, was considered to be quite
comprehensive, and as elsewhere in Latin America, more so than its cor-
responding laws on patents, trademarks and trade secrets.6 8
Nevertheless, the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA)
estimated losses to piracy by U.S. firms (excluding, of course, other non-
U.S. foreign firms and domestic firms) at US$263 million per year com-
posed primarily of losses for the recording industry (US$75 million), mo-
tion pictures (US$88 million) and most importantly computer software
63. Id. at 6-8.
64. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 253, 256.
65. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 47, at 240.
66. Pemberton, supra note 39, at 103; Ley de Fomento y Proteccion de la Propriedad
Intellectual, Art. 214, supra note 39.
67. Law Amending the Federal Law of Copyright, D.O. (11 January 1982).
68. USITC, U.S.-MExIco REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-10.
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(US$100 million). 9 Though these numbers may represent negotiating
tools, they can be largely explained by discrete lacuna in the Copyright
Law which, for the most part, have been filled by the most recent amend-
ments but whose enforcement is still found to be lacking. These involve
for the first time the inclusion of sound recordings as protected works as
well as the producer of records"0 and computer programs.7 1 Moreover, in
order to overcome the losses to movie owners in the U.S. as a result of
unauthorized reception and retransmission of broadcast signals from U.S.
and Intelsat satellites by hotels and resorts in Mexico for the benefit of
paying guests, the definition of public performance has been tightened to
include representatives or performances when it is presented by any
means to audiences or spectators without restricting it to persons belong-
ing to a private group.72 However, probably the most important change in
the new law was the significant increase in the level of criminal penalties
for copyright infringement with many violations carrying prison terms of
six months to six years and fines up to 500 times the minimum daily
general salary or US$2,000, which is still small but a substantial increase
over the historical fine of US$4.00 which had eroded over time due to
inflation.7 3 Nevertheless, for these reforms to have an appropriate impact,
they will have to be accompanied by the strengthening of the Prosecutor's
Office, Mexican police and the Copyright Office.
VI. CHILE
As in the case of most of the rest of Latin America, Chile struggled
through most of the 1980s as a result of a legacy of excessive foreign debt,
insufficient exports to compensate for the fluctuation in export earnings
from copper, its primary export item, and insufficient foreign direct in-
vestment partly the result of the presence of a military dictatorship for
most of the decade. Nevertheless, Chile was one of the first Latin Ameri-
can countries to launch an "adjustment" program partially funded by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank involving sub-
stantial cuts in public expenditures, reductions in tariff protection and
measures to boost exports, further privatization efforts, and special incen-
tives to attract foreign direct investment through such measures as debt/
equity swaps. The process of adjustment has been completed for a num-
ber of years, and as a result, Chile has enjoyed average growth rates of
GDP in excess of six percent over the past two to three years, coinciding
with a return to democracy in 1989.
69. IIPA, REPORT TO SECTION 301 COMMITrEE OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, February 25, 1992 at 61 in which it recommended that Mexico be
placed once again on the Special 301 Watch List from which it was removed in January
1990 when the Mexican government first outlined its planned reform in its 18 regions in its
"Industry and Trade Sectoral Plan."
70. Law Amending the Federal Law of Copyright, art. 83 D.O. (July 9, 1991).
71. Id. art. 7.
72. Id. art. 72.
73. Id. arts. 135-143.
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As part of its more outward looking strategy, Chile has sought more
direct trading ties With its major trading partners, particularly the U.S.
As a result of the Enterprise for Americas Initiative (EAI) announced by
the U.S. in 1990, Chile signed a framework agreement with the U.S. on
October 1, 1990 which established a U.S.-Chile Council on Trade and In-
vestment with the objective to monitor trade and investment relations,
open markets between the two countries and negotiate agreements when
appropriate. The Council's agenda includes cooperation in the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT, increased market
access, adequate and effective protection for IP rights, investment policy,
and the reduction of barriers to trade and investment in the hemi-
sphere."4 The backdrop to this initiative is that both countries have been
exploring the possibility of concluding a free trade agreement following
the lead provided by Mexico. Chile has made a conscious decision to seek
closer trade ties with the U.S. rather than with its immediate neighbors
that make up the proposed Mercado del Cono Sur (Brazil, Argentina,
Uruguay and Paraguay) to take effect in 1994/95 on the grounds that it
wishes to associate itself with the more stable policy environment of its
potential North American FTA partners.
As with the rest of Latin America, Chile has also actively partici-
pated in multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT, and on January 23,
1991, Chile's Parliament approved Chile's accession to the Paris Conven-
tion.7 5 Nevertheless, it is clear that the accelerated bilateral discussions
with the U.S. have been instrumental in promoting recent reforms of
Chile's IP laws.
A. Patents and Trademarks
Up until this year, Chile's patent and trademark protection had been
governed by the 1931 Law. 76 However, through a major change in its leg-
islative framework, the Chilean Parliament passed a new IP law on Janu-
ary 25, 199117 followed by detailed regulations on September 30, 1991
which signalled the formal effectiveness of the law. While the old law cov-
ered many of the traditional elements of a typical IP law, the new law is
noteworthy for a number of significant major reforms.
To begin with, for the first time, the new law includes the possibility
of protection for pharmaceuticals by virtue of it not being included in a
list of negative items (articles 38 and 39) such as scientific theories or
inventions that are contrary to morality or public order. As in many other
countries, the inclusion of pharmaceuticals in an IP law was hotly con-
tested, particularly by the domestic Chilean pharmaceutical industry
(ASILFA) which saw the inclusion as a threat to its own livelihood as well
74. 4 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, 245 (1990).
75. Id. vol. 5, at 55.
76. Decree Law 958.
77. Law 19.039.
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as from the public at large which feared that the cost of pharmaceuticals
would skyrocket making them unaffordable to the poorer segments of the
population.7 8 Partly to deal with the possibility of monopoly pricing once
protection was established, the law provides (article 51) for compulsory
licenses with a guaranteed minimum royalty when abuse of market power
is evident. Moreover, when a pharmaceutical patent has been filed
abroad, an application may be filed only when the foreign application
postdates entering into force of the new law.79 Finally, the duration of all
patents is fifteen years from the date a patent is granted, or less than the
seventeen years from the date a patent application is granted as in the
U.S.
A further significant change in the new law involves the establish-
ment of an Arbitral Tribunal (article 17) to hear appeals of some of the
administrative decisions of the Industrial Property Office, the agency re-
sponsible for administering the law. The Tribunal is composed of three
members (two ministerial appointments and one lawyer elected by the
Court of Appeals in Santiago) for two year terms with an arrangement to
meet as often as necessary. This should speed up the process of adminis-
trative review of patent decisions.
With respect to trademarks, minor improvements have been included
(articles 23 to 26) involving improved protection for well-known marks
and the extension of the period of cancellation from two to five years. As
before, there would be no compulsory licensing of unused marks.
Finally, fines of between US$4,000 and US$40,000 would be available
for any kind of infringement (articles 28 and 52). However, no implicit
treatment is given for trade secrets in the new law, though as in Argen-
tina, this is covered under the Penal Code.
B. Copyright
Chile is a signatory to the Berne Convention, the Universal Copy-
right Convention, the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, and the Ge-
neva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication."°
Chile's copyright protection is contained in Law No. 17.336 as re-
cently amended by Law No. 18.957 of February 22, 1990 and the accom-
panying Regulations. The law protects seventeen different categories of
78. A detailed study prepared by the Universidad Catolica de Chile, EFECTOS DE LAS
PATENTES DE MEDICAMENTOS SOBRE EL MERCADO FARMACEUTICO Y SU IMPACTO SOBRE LA
SALUD Y EL GUSTO FISCAl (1987), concluded that patenting of pharmaceuticals would entail
an additional cost of between US$5 to US$18 million for royalty payment per annum as well
as up to US$7 million per year in government subsidies and other expenditures. There is
considerable dispute within Chile, however, over some of the assumptions of the study.
79. Law 19.039, supra note 77, arts. 34-38.
80. For a detailed assessment of the Chile Copyright laws, see IIPA, COPYRIGHT PIRACY
IN LATIN AMERICA 48-57 (1991).
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works (article 3) including for the first time, as a result of the most recent
amendment, computer programs and videograms, a significant develop-
ment. As in the Berne Convention, the Chilean law also provides for
moral rights (articles 14 to 16). However, unlike the Berne Convention,
the duration of protection extends only to the life of the author plus
thirty years rather than the more typical fifty years, though a bill is now
pending to achieve the latter.
The copyright owner enjoys the exclusive right of publication
(broadly defined), reproduction, adaptation and performance (article 18).
Moreover, in a somewhat unusual feature, a Chilean author of a painting
or sculpture has the inalienable right to receive five percent of any in-
crease in price realized when the work is sold at a public sale or through
an established dealer.8 The present law protects the rights of all Chilean
authors and of foreigners domiciled in Chile. The rights of foreign authors
not domiciled in Chile enjoy the protection to which they are entitled by
virtue of the international conventions that Chile has subscribed to and
ratified.82
Violations of the law are punishable by fines for a maximum of
$1,900 (article 78) as well as the possibility of minor imprisonment (arti-
cle 79). However, for a copyright owner to avail to these rights, registra-
tion with the Register of Intellectual Property is mandatory (article 72).
Overall, Chile's copyright protection, particularly with the inclusion
of computer programs, appears to be broadly satisfactory with the excep-
tion of the life plus thirty duration requirement, the need for some
greater precision in the definition of what is covered, and more effective
penalties for infringement.
VII. ARGENTINA
Unlike Mexico and Chile, Argentina is still in the process of undergo-
ing a substantial adjustment program to deal with high levels of foreign
debt, a stagnant economy and excessive amounts of external protection
that permitted the survival of inefficient domestic industries that also
benefitted from special subsidies. Whereas Mexico and Chile have largely
completed their adjustment programs and fashioned more outward look-
ing economies in anticipation of adherence to free trade agreements with
the U.S. and Canada, Argentina is still in the process of improving the
public fiscal position through a massive program of privatization, cuts in
fiscal expenditures, elimination of special tax incentives for industries,
and reduced tariff protection to allow for greater import competition to
improve domestic efficiency.83 Moreover, Argentina has decided for the
81. Law No. 18.457, art. 36.
82. Id. art. 2.
83. Despite these lags in adjustment, Argentina has begun to enjoy the substantial flows
of foreign direct investment and repatriation of capital which Mexico and Chile have been
enjoying for some time.
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time being to pursue a regional economic trade bloc, the Mercosur, as
part of its new outward looking strategy as opposed to seeking direct free
trade links with the U.S. and Canada as Mexico and Chile have, though
the Mercosur countries signed the EAI Framework Agreement on Trade
and Investment in June 1991. Moreover, on November 14, 1991, Argen-
tina signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the U.S. which
guarantees equal treatment between foreign and domestic investors in ad-
dition to provision for international arbitration. Given Argentina's
predominantly agricultural base, which provides for the bulk of its ex-
ports, in its trade relationships with developed countries, it must face a
very elaborate set of protectionist barriers in economies such as the Euro-
pean Community and the U.S. which clearly affect its willingness to offer
concessions in other areas such as IP. Nevertheless, Argentina was subject
to a Section 301 investigation on pharmaceutical patent protection in
1988 which was withdrawn in 1989 based on expectations of legislative
reform, though Argentina was placed on the "Special 301" watch list in
1989 and remains there.84 As in most Latin American countries, the
evolution of IP protection has been more pronounced in the case of copy-
right rather than patent law, though both still have shortcomings as dis-
cussed below. This is particularly true in Argentina, an agriculturally-
based economy that would benefit from biotechnology applications to its
animals and crops and which also has a long tradition of literacy and cul-
tural development.
A. Patent Protection
Argentina's patent law protection dates back to October 11, 1864
with the passage of its first patent law8 which, aside from minor amend-
ments, has not been substantially modified despite the fact that Argen-
tina acceded to the Paris Convention in 1966s s but has not made changes
in its legislation to conform to the Convention's obligations. Nevertheless,
over the years, new patent laws have been proposed to the Congress, none
of which has yet been adopted. However, partly in response to the Special
301 pressure, the Menem government recently (October 10, 1991) sent a
new law to the Argentine Congress which addresses many of the long-
standing objections to the Argentine Law.
8 7
The existing law provides patent protection for inventions and de-
signs based on novelty criteria, covering both product and process pat-
ents. However, the law (article 4) specifically excludes product patent
protection for pharmaceuticals in addition to computer programs and, of
84. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1992 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE DIVISION 8.
85. Patent Law No. 111.
86. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 125.
87. Draft patent law and accompanying explanatory statement submitted to Congress
by Domingo F. Cavallo, Minister of Economy and Public Works and Services, and Avelino
Jose Porto, Minister of Health and Social Action, on October 10, 1991.
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course, items which violate Argentine law or morals. However, under the
proposed new law, the restrictions on product patent protection on
pharmaceuticals is being eliminated (by simply not explicitly mentioning
it)."8 Given Argentina's long standing hostility to such a move, this repre-
sents a major change in thinking, though respected independent think
tanks in Argentina such as the Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas
Latinoamericanas (FIEL) had already reached similar recommendations
based on an economic analysis.89 Specifically, since over ninety percent of
pharmaceutical products sold in Argentina are off-patent, any price in-
creases resulting from enhanced protection would only apply to a small
fraction of the products on the market.
The present law provides for patent protection for up to fifteen years
(no extension) while design patents are good for five years with the possi-
bility of two to five year extensions. The new law is proposing an increase
to twenty years from the date of filing.
Another aspect of the Argentine law that has been criticized90 was
the provision (article 47) whereby a patent lapses if not worked within
two years from the date of issuance, or if there is more than a two year
interruption in working the patent. This was not in conformity with Arti-
cle 5A(3) and (4) of the Paris Convention, and as a result of the proposed
new law (Article 46) provides for compulsory licenses only after three
years following patent issuance or four years after filing where the inven-
tion has not been exploited (barring force majeure) and no serious effort
has been made to exploit it. Nevertheless, the proposed law goes on to
suggest that compulsory licenses will be granted when there is an abuse of
market position or price discrimination that could itself lead to abuse. It
is also unclear as to whether parallel imports would be permitted, a par-
ticular concern in the light of developments concerning Mercosur. On a
positive note, the proposed law contains "pipeline" protection (Article
101) for patent applications that are covered under the proposed law but
not under the existing law provided they are submitted within a year of
the effectiveness of the proposed law and that exploitation of the inven-
tion or importation on a commercial scale has not begun.
A further area of criticism of the present law has been in the area of
remedies and their enforcement. Specifically, the present law does not al-
low for preliminary injunctions in infringement cases, the burden of proof
lies with the infringed party and remedies include only a maximum crimi-
nal sentence of one to six months, and a fine of 500 pesos (US$500).
While the contours of the proposed new law still must await its passage
and the promulgation of the companion regulations, the proposed law
88. Process pharmaceutical patents are already available but this provides very little
protection since pharmaceutical products can be manufactured in many different ways that
such protection can be circumvented.
89. FIEL, PROTECCION EN LOS DOS DERECHOS DE PROPRIEDAD INTELLECTUAL - EL CASO DE
LA INDUSTRIA FARMACEUTICA EN LA ARGENTINA, (1990).
90. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 126-7.
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does include (Article 76) a modest increase in penalty from six months to
three years incarceration in addition to an unspecified level of fine.91
Finally, although Argentina is a signatory to the Patent Cooperative
Treaty (PCT), the treaty has not been ratified and thus has no effect in
Argentina.
It is worth noting that neither the existing or proposed law provides
any protection for trade secrets, nor for mask works. However, trade
secrets and know-how are recognized as property rights under article 2312
of the Civil Code and are in theory protected under article 156 of the
Penal Code.
Argentina registers both trademarks and service marks, and trade-
mark registration is valid for ten years and renewable for additional ten
year periods, though violations are subject to imprisonment of one month
to one year and a fine also of 500 pesos.
B. Copyright
The protection of copyrights in Argentina is based on Law 11,723
enacted on September 23, 1933 and since amended, supplemented by spe-
cial laws, and clarified in case law, remains in effect.92 Argentina acceded
to the Buenos Aires Convention in 1950, the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion in 1958, the Berne Convention in 1967 (the 1948 Brussels text but
not the 1971 Berne text), the Geneva Phonograms Convention in 1973,
and the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations in 1992.11
Article 1 of the Copyright Act covers writings of any nature or length;
dramatic works, cinematographic, choreographic and pantomime works;
drawings, paintings and works of sculpture; works of architecture and of
art or sciences applied to commerce or industry; printed matter, plan and
maps; plastic works, photographs, engravings and phonograms; and all
scientific, literary, artistic or educational productions regardless of me-
dium.9' To be copyrightable, the work must contain a minimum amount
of originality and novelty, and be expressed in a material form which can
be perceived by others.95 Excluded from coverage are computer programs,
though the National Registry of Copyright has accepted applications to
register computer programs, as well as compilations and databases which
tend to be granted protection under case law though two bills are now
pending in Congress which would include protection for computer
91. In addition, the administrative machinery that is responsible for the examination
and granting of patent applications needs to be substantially improved.
92. MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND PAUL EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE §1, at 8 (1992).
93. For a detailed evaluation of the Argentine Copyright Law, see IIPA, supra note 80,
at 21-30.
94. NIMMER, supra note 92, §2(2) at 20.




Foreign works are eligible for protection in Argentina as long as the
author belongs to a country which recognizes copyright and the author
of the foreign work meets any formalities of the country of origin.
Such unilateral protection provides full protection to works published
in the United States after 1933 as long as those U.S. works comply
with U.S. formalities.9
Article 2 of the Copyright Act provides for the exclusive rights of
publication, public performance, translation, adaptation and reproduc-
tion. But the definition of public performance refers only to the radio
telephonic transmission, cinematographic exhibitions, television transmis-
sions, or any other method of mechanical reproduction of any literary or
outside work but does not include any express provision for communica-
tion to the public by wire.
With respect to duration, the Copyright Act provides for protection
for the life of the author plus his heirs for fifty years (Article 2), a "nor-
mal" period by comparative standards, but photographic works receive
only twenty years while cinematographic works only thirty years (Article
34).
Article 57 requires publishers of works to register and deposit copies
of their works at the Argentine National Copyright Registry within three
months of the date of publication, or face a fine and suspension of the
author's economic rights (Article 63).
With respect to enforcement, the Copyright Act (Articles 72, 73 and
75) provides for preliminary injunctions and confiscation of infringing
works as well as criminal sanctions involving imprisonment from between
one month to one year, and a fine of 1,000 pesos. Estimates of U.S. trade
losses due to piracy of motion pictures, sound recordings and musical
compositions in Argentina are estimated at US$43.6 million9" involving
primarily computer software, video, cable and audio-cassette piracy.
Thus, while Argentina has a long record of IP protection in the copy-
right area, its legislation should be brought more up to date (in line with
the 1971 text of the Berne Convention) to include provision for the cover-
age of computer programs, compilations and databases, right of public
performance to include retransmission by wire, protection against the
parallel importation of works, and enactment of stiffer fines.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Any cost benefit analysis of the merits of strengthening IP protection
must necessarily be country specific though a broad range of factors on
both sides of the argument can be identified. On the cost side, developing
96. Id. § 2(3)(b) at 22.
97. IIPA, supra note 80, at 24.
98. Id. at 22.
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countries might anticipate increased outflows of royalty payments on pat-
ent licenses for the patents on products which have not yet expired and
formerly pirated copyright works, some displacement of local "pirates",
and the somewhat remote risk of abuse of market power by virtue of
granting of foreign "monopolies". These monopolies, in the absence of
compulsory licensing following the expiration of "grace" periods, might
lead to higher domestic prices to segments of the local population. The
importance of these factors would vary from country to country, but
should be the subject of further empirical research.
On the benefit side, evidence suggests that there is a causal connec-
tion between levels of investment including licensing of technology, par-
ticularly for industries with high R&D costs such as pharmaceuticals, and
adequate IP protection. Furthermore, this should lead, in the case of pat-
ents, trademarks and trade secrets, to greater confidence by domestic pro-
ducers that their own R&D efforts would not be lost through infringe-
ment. Indeed, in the course of the Uruguay Round talks over the past six
years, many developing countries have come to recognize the benefits of
increased IP protection for their own economic self-interest. The case of
copyright laws is less clear, though by and large, the three countries ex-
amined have been more forthcoming in copyright protection given their
long established literary traditions. Nevertheless, in the newer areas such
as protection for computer programs, external pressure has been required
to achieve improved results.
Applying this broad framework to Mexico, Chile and Argentina, all of
which are highly indebted but have either completed (Mexico, Chile) or
are in the process of completing (Argentina) major economic adjustment
efforts that, amongst other things, involve a liberalization of the trade
and investment regime, can help explain the recent IP initiative. Thus, in
the final analysis, it is probably the "marriage of convenience" between
trade and investment reform on the one hand and IP protection on the
other, that has had the greatest impact on the IP reform in the three
countries.
Specifically, Mexico's desire to enter into a NAFTA agreement with
the U.S. and Canada, with the obvious benefit that would entail, was a
contributing factor in encouraging adoption of the very "modern" IP law
in Mexico in 1991. Chile, and to a lesser extent Argentina, have similar
long-term objectives (though for Argentina this may be done in the con-
text of the Mercosur). Moreover, all three countries have been responding
to bilateral pressure from the U.S. as part of its "Special 301" initiative.
In the short run, the direct impact of such new legislation (depend-
ing, of course, on the extent to which it is enforced) may entail some
increased outflows of payments for IP benefits perhaps partially compen-
sated by increased investment flows. However, the recent inclusion of
pharmaceutical protection in the laws of Chile, unlike Mexico and Argen-
tina (proposed), would probably not have significant implications for do-
mestic prices particularly in the short run since patents will be enforced
only for products not currently manufactured (no "pipeline" protection)
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and prices of imitation products produced by local companies in develop-
ing countries are sometimes higher than the price of the original product
produced by foreign companies. Finally, benefits should also accrue to
consumers in the form of higher quality products based on tightened cer-
tification requirements.
Nevertheless, in the medium-term, multilateral solutions under a
TRIPs agreement as part of the Uruguay Round appear to show the
greatest prospect for sustainability in that they provide a forum for devel-
oping countries to offer concessions in some areas that have significant
financial and balance of payments implications (such as enhanced IP pro-
tection) though accompanied by benefits domestically as well, in ex-
change for concessions by developed countries such as in agriculture, tex-
tiles etc. which would provide compensatory export revenue potential for
developing countries. Though bilateral pressure, particularly from the
U.S., has clearly accelerated the process of IP reform in these countries, a
multilateral framework is far more likely to yield long-term benefits to all
parties.
In any event, the optimal policy package may be for developing coun-
tries to strengthen IP protection while simultaneously reducing other bar-
riers to competition that relate to the non-technical aspects of competi-
tive advantage which would include further liberalization of trade regimes
and focussing on antitrust implications of licensing technology. Finally,
for such new laws to achieve the results that were originally intended,
they will have to be vigorously enforced with appropriate penalties which
in turn would require judicial reform in many developing countries in-
cluding better court administration, reform of procedural and civil codes,
and more relevant training for lawyers and judges.
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